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15	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
16	SOUTHERN DISTR	ICT OF CALIFORNIA
17	ViaSat, Inc.,	Case No. 3:16-cv-00463-BEN-JMA
	a Delaware corporation,	
18		DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO
19	Plaintiff	PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE
20	and Counter Defendant,	APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SURREPLY TO
	V.	DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
21	Acacia Communications, Inc.,	PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
22	a Delaware corporation,	3
23	D. C. v. 1. v.	Judge: Hon. Roger T. Benitez
24	Defendant and Counter Claimant.	Mag. Judge: Hon. Jan M. Adler
	and Counter Gainlant.	No Oral Argument
25		Application Under Submission
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Case No. 3:16-CV-00463-BEN-JMA

Defendant Acacia Communications, Inc. ("Acacia") hereby opposes Plaintiff ViaSat, Inc.'s ("ViaSat") request for leave to file a surreply to Acacia's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. ViaSat's request should be denied.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize the filing of a surreply, and neither do the Local Rules. Although district courts have discretion as to whether to permit or preclude the filing of a surreply (Johnson v. Wennes, No. 08-1798, 2009 WL 1161620, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2009)), courts have generally viewed motions for leave to file a surreply with disfavor, allowing them "only where a valid reason for such additional briefing exists, such as where the movant raises new arguments in its reply brief." Hill v. England, No. 05-869, 2005 WL 3031136, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2005) (citation omitted) (motion for leave to file surreply denied because new arguments were not raised by the reply brief); JG v. Donglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 552 F.3d 786, 803 n.14 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of motion for leave to file surreply because new evidence was not considered in the reply); Flournoy v. Sacramento Cty. Sheriff Dep't, No. 11-2844, 2017 WL 4237868, at *15 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2017) (striking surreply as lacking good cause, such as responding to new arguments raised in reply brief).

Here, ViaSat's proposed surreply focuses on an issue – the reconsideration decision of the court in *Digital Envoy II* – that ViaSat could (and should) have cited to this Court and discussed in its Opposition, when it cited *Digital Envoy I*.

ViaSat's proposed surreply would merely compound the error sown by its Opposition. While the Opposition ignored *Digital Envoy II* altogether, one might charitably conclude that ViaSat had merely neglected to locate that decision. But now that ViaSat has seen that holding, its attempt, in the surreply, to brush it aside as irrelevant is inexplicable.

It would be unfair to Acacia for ViaSat to be allowed to raise the issues in its surreply without Acacia having the same opportunity to reply that it would have had if ViaSat had made these arguments in its Opposition. This prejudice is material because ViaSat's arguments are legally incorrect and misleading on a dispositive issue.

1 In its reconsideration ruling in *Digital Envoy II*, that court addressed, head-on, 2 the precise issue that divides the parties here: Is it contrary to law for a court to 3 enforce a contractual limitation on liability clause that purports to limit liability for 4 trade secret misappropriation claims? *Digital Envoy II* at 5-6. The court's answer was 5 no: There is **no** legal obstacle to enforcing such a limitation clause. (Indeed, in that 6 case, it was a fully **exculpatory** clause, not merely a generously-set cap, as here.) 7 ViaSat's sole effort to distinguish that case on the merits in its proposed 8 surreply – which it buries in footnote 1 – is unavailing. ViaSat points out that, in 9 Digital Envoy II, there was language about "willful misconduct" not present here. But 10 that fact only helps Acacia. The "willful" language in Digital Envoy I and II is what 11 gave rise to the need for the Court to assess whether or not the exculpatory 12 contractual language applied, by its own terms, to the trade secrets claim in that case. 13 That issue is not in dispute here – it is undisputed that, by expressly covering "tort" 14 claims – Section 13 does purport, on its face, to limit liability for trade secret claims. 15 ViaSat's argument is that there is some kind of legal prohibition on a clause that does 16 that. Digital Envoy II holds expressly the opposite. 17 Given the amount of paper already before the Court, Acacia will not at this time 18 address the remainder of ViaSat's new arguments or other rhetoric in its surreply. 19 In sum, ViaSat's request for leave to file a surreply should be denied, or in the 20 alternative Acacia should be given leave to respond. 21 Date: February 16, 2018 Respectfully Submitted, 22 23 WOLF, GREENFIELD & SACKS, P.C. 24 By: s/ Michael A. Albert 25 Michael A. Albert Hunter D. Keeton 26 Stuart V. C. Duncan Smith 27 Attorneys for Defendant and Counter 28

Claimant Acacia Communications, Inc.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that today I am causing to be served the foregoing document by CM/ECF notice of electronic filing upon the parties and counsel registered as CM/ECF Users. I further certify that, to the extent they are not registered CM/ECF Users, I am causing the foregoing document to be served by electronic means via email upon counsel for ViaSat, Inc., per the agreement of counsel. Date: February 16, 2018 s/ Michael A. Albert Michael A. Albert